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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Roy T. Gwin appeals, challenging the district court's denial of his motion to
suppress, and the unified sentence of 20 years with three years fixed it imposed upon
/

his conviction for driving under the influence with a persistent violator enhancement.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
The district court related the following factual background for this case:
On August 9, 2010 the police were notified of a physical
disturbance on Golf Course Road. Deputy McRoberts arrived on the
scene and spoke with David Gwin who stated he and his father had been
in an altercation and that his father had left driving a green, Chevrolet
Blazer. Deputy Summers was notified by McRoberts to locate a green,
Chevrolet Blazer driving in the area and Summers observed such a
vehicle and initiated [a] traffic stop. The driver was David Gwin's father,
Roy Gwin, the defendant.
Deputy Summers after the traffic stop
determined that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol and the
defendant was then arrested for DUI.
(R., pp.112-13.)

The State charged Gwin with felony driving under the influence with a persistent
violator enhancement.

(R., pp.69-74.)

Gwin filed a motion to suppress evidence,

challenging the reasonable suspicion for the initial traffic stop.
district court denied Gwin's suppression motion.

(R., pp.95-96.)

(R., pp.112-19.)

The

Gwin entered a

conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the district court's denial of his
suppression motion. (R., pp.143-44.) The district court entered judgment of conviction
on the felony driving under the influence, finding Gwin to be a persistent violator of the
law, and imposed a unified sentence of 20 years with three fixed.
Gwin filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.158-60.)
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(R., pp.151-56.)

ISSUES
Gwin states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Gwin's motion to
suppress?
2.
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified
sentence of twenty years, with three years fixed, upon Mr. Gwin following
his plea of guilty to felony driving under the influence and a persistent
violator enhancement?
(Appellant's brief, p.4.)
The State rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Gwin failed to show error in the district court's denial of his motion to
suppress?
2.
Has Gwin failed to establish an abuse of discretion by the district court in
imposing a unified sentence of 20 years with three years fixed upon Gwin's conviction
for felony driving under the influence with a persistent violator enhancement?
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ARGUMENT
L
Gwin has Failed to Show Error in the District Court's Denial of his Suppression Motion
A.

Introduction
Although he concedes that officers had "reasonable suspicion to conduct an

investigative detention," Gwin asserts that they "did not have reasonable suspicion to
conduct a traffic stop," and therefore the district court erred in denying his suppression
motion. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-8.) Gwin's argument that there are different reasonable
suspicion standards for a "detention" and a "traffic stop" is without merit. He has failed
to show either clear error in the district court's factual findings, or error in its application
of law to those findings. The district court's denial of his suppression motion should
therefore be affirmed.

B.

Standard of Review
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court accepts the

trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence and exercises
free review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards have
been satisfied in light of the facts. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-86, 211
P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.
App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses,
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the
trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State
v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
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C.

The District Court Correctly Denied Gwin's Suppression Motion
A routine traffic stop by a police officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's

occupants and implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures.

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v.

Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct. App. 1998). Because a routine
traffic stop is normally limited in scope and duration, it is analyzed under the principles
of an investigative detention as set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Prouse,
440 U.S. at 653-54; State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct.
App. 2003).

"An investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon specific

articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is
about to be engaged in criminal activity." Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983, 88 P.3d at 1223
(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific articulable facts and the
rational inferences that naturally follow from those facts. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; State v.
Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 896-97, 821 P.2d 949, 951-52 (1991). While the quantity
and quality of information necessary to establish reasonable suspicion is less than that
necessary to establish probable cause, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990),
reasonable

suspicion

requires

more

than

a

mere

hunch

or

"inchoate

unparticularized suspicion" United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).

and
The

reasonableness of the police officer's suspicion is evaluated based upon the totality of
the circumstances at the time of the seizure.

Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18; State v.

Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932, 829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992); State v. Schumacher, 136
Idaho 509, 515, 37 P.3d 6, 12 (Ct. App. 2001 ).

4

Reasonable suspicion may be supplied by an informant's tip or a citizen's report
of suspected criminal activity. State v. Larson, 135 Idaho 99,101, 15 P.3d 334,336 (Ct.
App. 2000).
Whether information from such a source is sufficient to create reasonable
suspicion depends upon the content and reliability of the information
presented by the source, including whether the informant reveals her
identity and the basis of her knowledge. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S.
325, 330 (1990); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1972). An anonymous tip, standing alone, is
generally not enough to justify a stop because "an anonymous tip alone
seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity .... "
White, 496 U.S. at 329. See also Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 269
(2000). However, when the information from an anonymous tip bears
sufficient indicia of reliability or is corroborated by independent police
observations, it may provide justification for a stop. White, 496 U.S. at
331. Where the information comes from a known citizen informant rather
than an anonymous tipster, the citizen's disclosure of her identity, which
carries the risk of accountability if the allegations turn out to be fabricated,
is generally deemed adequate to show veracity and reliability. Gates, 462
U.S. at 233; Williams, 407 U.S. at 146-47; State v. O'Bryan, 96 Idaho 548,
552, 531 P.2d 1193, 1197 (1975); State v. Peterson, 133 Idaho 44, 47,
981 P.2d 1154, 1157 (Ct. App. 1999); Dunlap v. State, 126 Idaho 901,
907, 894 P.2d 134, 140 (Ct. App. 1995).
Id.
The district court found that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop Gwin as
they performed their investigative functions.

(R., pp.118-19.)

This determination is

amply supported by the Record. Police received an anonymous tip that there was an
altercation taking place in the middle of Golf Course Road. (Tr., p.7, L.8 - p.8, L.8;
p.20, L.16 - p.21, L.1.) Officers McRoberts and Summers, in separate cars, went to
investigate the disturbance. (Tr., p.16, Ls.7-17.) Officer McRoberts found David Gwin
in the vicinity of the reported altercation and contacted him. (Tr., p.8, L.12 - p.9, L.5.)
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David Gwin's statement and appearance corroborated the information from the
anonymous tipster regarding the altercation; he confirmed that he was a participant in
the fight and told police that his father, the other participant, was in the vicinity driving a
green Chevy Blazer. (Tr., p.9, L.19 - p.13, L.1.) Shortly thereafter, Officer Summers
spotted a green Chevy Blazer in the near vicinity that matched the description and
stopped the vehicle to investigate. (Tr., p.24, Ls.2-21.) This occurred in the early hours
of a Monday morning, in a rural area, when there was very little traffic. (R., pp.14-17.)
Denying Gwin's suppression motion, the district court noted:
The deputies new [sic] at the time that the traffic stop was made that the
defendant and his son had been in a fight. The altercation resulted in a
citizen's call to dispatch. The defendant had left his son stranded in the
early morning hours. The deputies had only one version of the altercation.
The defendant's vehicle was spotted in the area of the altercation and the
traffic stop was in the vicinity of the altercation. This court is persuaded
that given the totality of the circumstances, Deputy Summers had a
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver of the stopped vehicle
was the same as the individual involved in the altercation, a possible
crime. Given the nature of the altercation, an officer could have thought
that the crimes of battery or assault could have been committed. This
court is not convinced that just because David Gwin did not appear to be
physically injured and did not wish to press charges that no crime may
have been committed and further investigation was unwarranted. This
court finds that it is reasonable to stop a green, Chevrolet Blazer; near the
scene of the altercation, at 2:00 a.m. on a Monday, when few cars are
likely to be on the road, let alone matching the description; based on the
totality of the circumstances. This combination of circumstances allowed
for a reasonable and articulable suspicion justifying the vehicle stop to
further investigate the report of the altercation between the defendant and
his son.

(R., pp.118-19.) Gwin has failed to establish clear error in any of these factual findings,
and Gwin has failed to establish error in the district court's application of the law to
those factual findings.
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Instead Gwin argues that, though the police had reasonable suspicion to conduct
an investigative detention, they lacked reasonable suspicion to enforce a traffic stop on
Gwin, because his son was not pressing charges.

(Appellant's brief, pp.6-8.)

In

addition to its self-contradictory nature, this argument that a victim willing to press
charges is a necessary element of reasonable suspicion is unsupported by any legal
authority and need not be addressed by this Court on appeal.
Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996).

State v. Zichko, 129

Rather, to perform an investigative

detention, police only need articulable facts that justify their suspicion "that the detained
person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." Sheldon, 139 Idaho
at 983, 88 P.3d at 1223. As the district court correctly noted below, "whether or not
David Gwin wants to press charges, that does not factor in as to whether there still was
a crime committed or possibly committed."

(Tr., p.33, Ls.19-22.)

Having failed to

establish either clear error in the district court's factual findings or error in the application
of relevant legal standards to those findings, Gwin has failed to show any error in the
district court's denial of his suppression motion.

The judgment of the district court

should be affirmed.

11.
Gwin has Failed to Establish an Abuse of the District Court's Sentencing Discretion
Gwin asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed and
executed a unified sentence of 20 years with three years fixed following his felony
driving under the influence conviction with a persistent violator enhancement, in light of
his history of substance abuse and other allegedly mitigating factors. (Appellant's brief,
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pp.9-12.)

Gwin has failed to establish an abuse of the district court's sentencing

discretion.
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant is required to establish
that the sentence is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38
P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To
carry this burden, the appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any
reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence of
confinement is reasonable if it appears at the time of sentencing that confinement is
necessary "to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any
or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given
case."

State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982).

Though courts review the whole sentence on appeal, the presumption is that the fixed
portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. State v.
Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). In deference to the trial judge,
the Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds
might differ. Toohill, 103 Idaho at 568, 650 P.2d at 710.
The facts of the present crime are straightforward:
Deputy Summers recognized that Gwin was drunk.

Upon pulling Gwin over,

(PSI, p.2; R., pp.14-17.)

A

breathalyzer confirmed that Gwin was driving over the legal limit, as he blew a .13. (Id.)
This was not Gwin's first DUI; it wasn't his first felony DUI. (See PSI, pp.3-5.) Gwin's
first DUI was in May, 1991 (PSI, p.3), he got another in November, 1991 (id.), his first
felony DUI came in 1992 (id.), and he received his second felony DUI in 2007 (PSI, p.5).
This is Gwin's third felony DUI. Gwin has had multiple opportunities to stop driving
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under the influence, yet has failed. And Gwin's lengthy criminal history, encompassing
the past two decades, is not limited to DUl's. Additionally, Gwin has been charged with
many felonies and misdemeanors, including Grand Theft, narcotics and paraphernalia
possession, malicious injury to property, driving without privileges, and uttering forged
documents, and for violating many probations and paroles. (PSI, pp.3-5.)
The district court appropriately considered all of the relevant factors when
crafting and imposing Gwin's sentence. (Tr., p.83, L.17 - p.84, L.3.) The district court
noted that this was Gwin's sixth felony conviction, and third felony DUI conviction. (Tr.,
p.84, Ls.9-18.) The district court also noted that Gwin had received extensive treatment
for his alcoholism and rehabilitative programming, yet he continued to both abuse
alcohol and to drive under the influence. (Tr., p.85, L.19 - p.87, L.18.) The district court
did recognize that Gwin had improved over time. (Tr., p.84, Ls.11-16; p.88, Ls.2-5.)
However, that minor improvement could not outweigh the significant risk Gwin poses to
the community as a habitual drunk driver. (Tr., p.84, L.17 - p.85, L.6; p.87, L.16- p.88,

L 10.) As the Court has said, "[t]he proverbial drunk driver cuts a wide path of death,
pain and grief, as well as untold physical and emotional injury, across the roads of Idaho
and the nation." State v. Puga, 131 Idaho 89, 90, 952 P.2d 904, 905 (Ct. App. 1997)
(quoted Tr., p.85, Ls.2-6).
Gwin argues that his history of substance abuse and professed willingness to
undergo treatment should have been weighed as stronger mitigating factors.
(Appellant's brief, pp.9-10.) This argument is unavailing. A history of alcohol abuse is
not a mitigating factor in relation to a crime which requires not only the repeated abuse
of alcohol, but driving while abusing alcohol. See Oliver, 144 Idaho at 727, 170 P.3d at
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392. Gwin also argues that the support of family and friends should result in a more
lenient sentence. (Appellant's brief, pp.10-11.) Gwin's argument, however, does not
change the fact that despite such support in the past, Gwin still repeatedly chose to
drink and drive.

Because the support of family members has yet to protect the

community from Gwin's driving under the influence, Gwin has failed to show that the
district court was required to conclude that it somehow would this time.
The district court addressed the relevant factors to be considered at the
sentencing hearing and exercised its discretion in imposing a reasonable sentence.
Gwin has failed to establish any abuse of the district court's sentencing discretion. The
judgment of the district court should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's denial of
Gwin's motion to suppress evidence, and affirm Gwin's conviction and sentence.

DATED this 17th day of October, 2011.

Deputy Attorney General
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